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Summary
Multisensory interactions are the norm in perception, and an
abundance of research on the interaction and integration of
the senses has demonstrated the importance of combining
sensory information fromdifferentmodalities on our percep-
tion of the external world [1–9]. However, although research
on mental imagery has revealed a great deal of functional
and neuroanatomical overlap between imagery and percep-
tion, this line of research has primarily focused on similar-
ities within a particular modality [10–16] and has yet to
address whether imagery is capable of leading to multisen-
sory integration. Here, we devised novel versions of classic
multisensory paradigms to systematically examine whether
imagery is capable of integrating with perceptual stimuli to
induce multisensory illusions. We found that imagining an
auditory stimulus at the moment two moving objects met
promoted an illusory bounce percept, as in the classic
cross-bounce illusion; an imagined visual stimulus led to
the translocation of sound toward the imagined stimulus,
as in the classic ventriloquist illusion; and auditory imagery
of speech stimuli led to a promotion of an illusory speech
percept in a modified version of the McGurk illusion. Our
findings provide support for perceptually based theories of
imagery and suggest that neuronal signals produced by
imagined stimuli can integrate with signals generated by
real stimuli of a different sensory modality to create robust
multisensory percepts. These findings advance our under-
standing of the relationship between imagery and percep-
tion and provide new opportunities for investigating how
the brain distinguishes between endogenous and exoge-
nous sensory events.
Results
Can what one imagines hearing change what one sees? Can
what one imagines seeing change what one hears? In ordinary
perception, multisensory integration is typical, and research
has found that the integration of sensory information across
sensory modalities can improve the detection and discrimina-
tion of events in our environment [1, 8, 17, 18] or lead to distor-
tions, as in the case of multisensory illusions [3, 6, 9]. Multisen-
sory illusions, such as the cross-bounce [3], ventriloquism [6],
and McGurk [9] illusions, are classic examples of how sensory
information in one modality can change what one perceives in
another. For instance, in the cross-bounce illusion [3], the
presentation of a sound close to the moment when two
objects coincide promotes the illusory perception that the
objects collide. In the ventriloquism illusion [6], variation of
the spatial relationship between audiovisual stimuli causes a*Correspondence: christopher.c.berger@ki.setranslocation of the auditory stimulus toward the visual stim-
ulus. In the McGurk illusion [9], an auditory stimulus of one
phoneme (e.g., ‘‘ba’’) paired with a visual stimulus of some-
one’s lip movements articulating a competing phoneme (e.g.,
‘‘ga’’), leads to a fused illusory auditory percept (e.g., ‘‘da’’).
Here, in a novel approach to investigating imagery andmaking
use of these three classic multisensory illusions, we examined
whether mental images are capable of leading to multisensory
integration.
Auditory Imagery and the Cross-bounce Illusion
In experiment 1A, we closely followed the methodology of
Sekuler et al.’s [3] original demonstration of the cross-bounce
illusion. In each trial, the participants (n = 22) focused on a
fixation cross while two blue disks appeared from the top-
right and top-left corners of the screen, moved 165.1 mm/s
at a 45 angle toward the opposite corner of the screen,
crossed in the middle at a fixation cross, and disappeared
off the screen in their respective corners. The participants
imagined hearing a sound (150 ms ‘‘clink’’) 500 ms before the
disks coincided, at the moment of coincidence, 500 ms after
they coincided, or not at all (all experiments were approved
by the Regional Ethical Review Board of Stockholm—see the
Supplemental Experimental Procedures for details; see Fig-
ure S1 available online for schematic overview of the experi-
mental procedure). Given the known effects of tactile stimula-
tion on the cross-bounce illusion [5], there was also an imagery
condition involvingmotor and tactile imagery (i.e., an imagined
finger tap) to investigate the extent or limitation of imagery on
the perception of bounce (see the Supplemental Experimental
Procedures and Supplemental Results for details).
The timing of the imagined sound significantly altered the
perceived motion of the circles. Specifically, imagination of
the sound at the moment the circles coincided led to a signif-
icant promotion of the perception that the circles bounced
compared to the view-only condition, whereas imagination of
the sound before or after coincidence did not (see Figure 1A).
To ensure that the promotion of the bounce percept was not
due to nonspecific effects of imagery at themoment the circles
coincided, we performed a control experiment (experiment 1B;
n = 12) in which participants imagined a sound at the moment
the circles coincided (as before), imagined a control motor
stimulus (i.e., a finger lift) at the moment the circles coincided,
or passively viewed the circles. A subsequent version of the
experiment, in which the participants actually heard a sound
or moved their finger at the moment of coincidence, was
also conducted for comparison.
Auditory imagery of a sound at the moment of coincidence
significantly promoted the perception of the bouncing percept
compared to the passive viewing and motor imagery control
conditions. These results were consistent with the results of
the subsequent perceptual version of the experiment (see Fig-
ure 1B). Taken together, these results suggest that auditory
imagery is capable of leading to multisensory integration.
Visual Imagery and Ventriloquism
In experiments 2A and 2B, we sought to determine whether
the perceptual effects outlined above were specific to the
Figure 1. Altered Motion Perception from Imagery
(A) Proportion of perceived bounce when no sound was imagined and when
sounds were imagined before, at, and after the moment of coincidence. The
timing of the imagined sound led to significant alterations in the perception
of motion [F(3, 19) = 9.78, p < 0.001]. Planned comparisons revealed a
significant promotion of the perception of bouncing when the sound was
imagined at the moment of coincidence compared to the passive viewing
condition [t(21) = 3.77, p = 0.001], whereas imagination of the sound before
[t(21) = 1.31, not significant (n.s.)] or after [t(21) = –0.12, n.s.] coincidence did
not. See the Supplemental Results for the results of an additional condition
containing tactile imagery (data not shown).
(B) Proportion of perceived bounce for both the imagined and real sound at
coincidence, finger lift at coincidence, and view-only conditions. Planned
comparisons revealed that imagination of a sound at the moment of
coincidence significantly promoted the perception of bounce compared
to the passive viewing [t(11) = 5.26, p < 0.001] and imagined finger lift
[t(11) = 3.35, p = 0.007] conditions, whereas imagination of the finger lift
[t(11) = 1.77, n.s.] or a real finger lift [t(11) = .54, n.s.] did not. Error bars
represent 6 SEM. Asterisks between bars indicate significance (**p <
0.01) for planned comparisons.
See also Figure S1.
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1368cross-bounce illusion or reflected a more general principle of
imagery-perception multisensory interactions. Toward this
end, we conducted two separate ventriloquism experiments.
In experiment 2A (n = 21), we used an adapted version of the
classic ventriloquism illusion [6, 7, 19]. The participants imag-
ined a white circle appearing in one of four locations on a wall
in front of them in a darkened room while maintaining fixation
(0). Auditory stimuli were presented at the same time and
location as the imagined visual stimuli, alone in the same loca-
tions, or at disparities of 15 or 30 from the imagined visual
stimuli (see the Supplemental Experimental Procedures for
details). To determine the extent of the translocation of
auditory stimuli toward the imagined stimuli, we calculated
the percentages of the bias toward the imagined visual stim-
ulus (%VB). To assess the extent to which auditory localization
precision was enhanced when the participants imagined
a visual stimulus in the same location, we calculated a
multisensory enhancement index (MEI; see the SupplementalExperimental Procedures for equations). After the imagery
version of this experiment, a version of the experiment using
real visual stimuli was conducted, and the %VBs and MEIs
were calculated for comparison with the imagery version of
the experiment (see Figure S2 for the mean localization errors
of all conditions).
Significant biases in the perceived sound location toward
imagined visual stimuli were observed for disparities of 15
and 30. A stronger %VB was observed for disparities of
30 compared to 15. Correspondingly, in the perceptual
version of the experiment, significant visual biases were
observed for audiovisual disparities of 15 and 30, with a
stronger %VB observed for audiovisual disparities of 30
compared to 15 (see Figure 2A). Furthermore, a multisensory
enhancement of auditory perception (i.e., increased sound
localization accuracy) was observed when the participants
imagined a visual stimulus in the same location as an auditory
stimulus. Similarly, a significant multisensory enhancement
of auditory perception was observed when a real visual
stimulus was presented in the same location as an auditory
stimulus in the perceptual version of the experiment (see
Figure 2B).
In experiment 2B, we made use of a psychophysical stair-
case procedure. The strength of this method is that it elimi-
nates any possible influence of voluntary postperceptual
decisions on the ventriloquism effect [20]. Closely following
the methodology of Bertelson and Aschersleben [20], we pre-
sented auditory stimuli to the participants (n = 18) from two
randomly selected staircases that began at extreme left or
right positions (48) and gradually converged as the partici-
pants made dichotomic judgments of whether the sound
came from the left or right of fixation (0). That is, for the left
staircase, the location of the sound moved one step to the
right (toward fixation) after the participant indicated that the
sound came from the left, and one step to the left (away from
fixation) after the participant indicated that the sound came
from the right. The opposite pattern was followed for the right
staircase. This procedure continued until the participant
made eight response reversals (i.e., responses that were
different than the previous response) on each staircase. In
this paradigm, the presentation of a visual stimulus at fixation
has been found to lead to earlier uncertainty—in the form of
response reversals—about the location of sounds presented
at locations further from fixation compared to when no visual
stimulus is presented at fixation [20]. This earlier uncertainly
is due to the translocation of the auditory stimuli toward the
visual stimuli presented at fixation. Thus, to test whether an
imagined visual stimulus could lead to the same translocation
of auditory stimuli, we had the participants imagine seeing a
white circle appear at fixation or simply maintain fixation in
two separate conditions that we counterbalanced across
participants. All analyses were conducted on the first eight
response reversals in each condition (see the Supplemental
Experimental Procedures for further detail).
We found that the staircases in the imagine-circle condition
converged more slowly and began further away compared to
the no-circle condition (Figure 2C), suggesting that the audi-
tory stimuli were drawn toward the imagined visual stimuli as
in experiment 2A. Moreover, the average distance between
the staircases was greater for the imagine-circle condition
than in the no-circle condition (Figure 2D).
Taken together, the results from experiments 2A and 2B
suggest that visual imagery is capable of leading to audiovi-
sual integration, providing further support for the hypothesis
Figure 2. Ventriloquism Effect from Visual
Imagery
(A) Percent visual bias for stimuli presented at
disparities of 15 and 30 for both imagined (left)
and real (right) visual stimuli. Significant biases
of perceived sound location toward the imagined
visual stimuli were observed for disparities of 15
[t(20) = 4.11, p = 0.001, single-sample t test (test
value = 0)] and 30 [t(20) = 18.39, p < 0.001, sin-
gle-sample t test (test value = 0)], with a stronger
bias for disparities of 30 compared to 15 [t(20) =
2.05, p = 0.05, paired-samples t test]. Significant
visual biases were also observed for 15 [t(20) =
10.38, p < 0.001, single-sample t test (test
value = 0)] and 30 [t(20) = 27.87, p < 0.001, sin-
gle-sample t test (test value = 0)] disparities,
and a stronger bias for disparities of 30
compared to 15 [t(20) = 2.76, p = 0.012, paired-
samples t test] was observed in the perceptual
version of the experiment.
(B) Multisensory enhancement of congruent, 15
incongruent, and 30 incongruent audiovisual
stimuli for imagined (left) and real (right) stimuli.
Multisensory enhancement of auditory percep-
tion was observed when the participant imagined
a visual stimulus in the same location as an audi-
tory stimulus [t(20) = 23.63, p = 0.002, single-
sample t test (test value = 0)]. Correspondingly,
a significant multisensory enhancement of audi-
tory perception was also observed for a real
visual stimulus presented in the same location
as an auditory stimulus [t(20) = 28.20, p < 0.001].
(C) Mean location, in degrees, of the first eight
response reversals on each staircase for the
imagine-circle and no-circle conditions.
(D) The average distance (in degrees) between
the left and right staircases was significantly
larger in the imagine-circle condition than
in the no-circle condition [t(17) = 2.39, p = 029].
Error bars denote 6 SEM. Asterisks above
bars indicate significance (**p < 0.01) for single-
sample tests. Asterisks between bars indicate
significance (*p < 0.05) for paired-sample tests.
See also Figures S1 and S2.
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1369that mental imagery is capable of integrating with perceptual
stimuli of a different sensory modality.
Auditory Imagery in a Modified McGurk Illusion
In experiment 3, we made use of a modified version of the
McGurk illusion to determine whether the imagery-induced
multisensory effects from the previous experiments could be
extended to speech perception. Toward this end, we tested
whether auditory imagery of one phoneme could integrate
with visual speech stimuli of another phoneme to promote an
illusory speech percept. We supplanted the auditory stimuli
from the classic McGurk illusion paradigm—in which an illu-
sory fused ‘‘da’’ percept is heard when a conflicting auditory
‘‘ba’’ is dubbed over a visual stimulus of a person saying
‘‘ga,’’ but not when dubbed with a nonconflicting auditory
stimulus, such as ‘‘ka’’ [9]—with the participants’ auditoryimagery. Thus, the participants (n = 23)
imagined either ‘‘ba’’ or ‘‘ka’’ while view-
ing videos of a person saying ‘‘ga.’’ The
imagine-‘‘ka’’ condition served to deter-
mine whether any effect was specific to
a conflicting auditory stimulus and not a
nonspecific effect of imagery per se. Abaseline condition in which the participants passively viewed
the videos was also included to assess the directionality of
any observed differences between imagery conditions. After
each video, the participants indicated whether they perceived
the person in the video to be saying ‘‘ga’’ (i.e., nonillusory
percept) or ‘‘da’’ (i.e., illusory percept). In this way, because
the participants could not report what they heard (because
the visual stimuli were silent) and instead reported what they
perceived the person in the video to say, the effects in this
modified McGurk paradigm may reflect the effects of a
‘‘reverse McGurk effect’’ [21, 22] in which auditory stimuli
change one’s perception of visual stimuli. For the analysis,
the participants were split into perceivers and nonperceivers
based on a postexperiment perceptual test for the illusion
(using real auditory stimuli of ‘‘ba’’ dubbed over visual stimuli
of a person mouthing ‘‘ga’’) that made use of the classic
Figure 3. Auditory Imagery-Induced McGurk Effect
Proportion of perceived illusory ‘‘da’’ when the participants imagined hear-
ing ‘‘ba,’’ imagined hearing ‘‘ka,’’ or passively viewed silent videos of a
person saying ‘‘ga’’ for McGurk illusion perceivers and nonperceivers. A sig-
nificant 3 (imagine ‘‘ba,’’ imagine ‘‘ka,’’ view only) 3 2 (perceivers, nonper-
ceivers) interaction was observed [F(2, 21) = 5.18, p = 0.01]. A significant
increase in the illusory ‘‘da’’ percept was observed in the imagine-‘‘ba’’
condition for perceivers compared to nonperceivers [t(21) = 2.73, p =
0.012]. No significant differences were observed between perceivers
and nonperceivers for the imagine-‘‘ka’’ [t(21) = 20.93, n.s.] or view-only
[t(21) = 20.52, n.s.] conditions. Error bars denote 6 SEM. The asterisk
indicates significance (*p < 0.016) for independent sample tests. See also
Figure S1.
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1370McGurk paradigm [9]. Thus, in the perceptual test for the illu-
sion, participants freely reported what they heard the person
in the video say. A participant was considered to be a
perceiver if he or she verbally reported hearing ‘‘da’’ at least
one of the three times the video was played.
Auditory imagery of ‘‘ba’’ led to an increased perception of
the ‘‘da’’ percept for perceivers compared to nonperceivers,
whereas auditory imagery of ‘‘ka’’ did not lead to any differ-
ence in the perception of ‘‘da’’ between perceivers and non-
perceivers (see Figure 3). Moreover, in perceivers, auditory
imagery of ‘‘ba’’ led to a significant increase in the perception
of ‘‘da’’ compared to auditory imagery of ‘‘ka,’’ whereas no
such difference was observed in nonperceivers (see the
Supplemental Results for additional analyses).
These results suggest that auditory imagery of a competing
phoneme while viewing an ambiguous speech percept pro-
motes an illusory speech percept, an effect that is specific
to the type of auditory stimulus imagined and depends on
whether one perceives the perceptual version of the illusion.
These findings provide evidence in favor of the hypothesis
that auditory imagery is capable of integrating with visual
speech stimuli to promote an illusory speech percept.
Discussion
In three separate paradigms, using different forms of imagery,
we found consistent evidence that imagery is capable of lead-
ing to perceptual illusions indicative of multisensory integra-
tion. In experiment 1A, we found that auditory imagery is
capable of leading to a promotion of the illusory perception
that two moving objects bounce off one another when imag-
ined at the moment of coincidence. Moreover, in experiment
1B, we found that imagination of a control stimulus did not pro-
mote the bouncing percept, suggesting that this effect is notmerely due to nonspecific effects of imagery at the moment
of coincidence. In experiments 2A and 2B, we found that imag-
ination of visual stimuli caused a translocation of spatially
disparate auditory stimuli toward the imagined visual stimuli,
and in experiment 2A we found that spatially congruent imag-
ined visual and real auditory stimuli led to an enhancement of
auditory localization. In experiment 3, we tested whether the
findings from the first two experiments could be extended to
complex speech stimuli in a modified version of the McGurk
illusion, andwe found that the auditory imagery of a competing
phoneme while viewing lip movements of a different phoneme
led to an increase in an illusory speech percept forMcGurk illu-
sion perceivers, an effect that was absent in nonperceivers. As
in experiments 1A and 1B, the results from experiment 3 sug-
gest that themultisensory effects of imagery are specific to the
types of perceptual stimuli that lead to multisensory integra-
tion. Together, these findings suggest that imagery is capable
of leading to multisensory integration and that imagery-
induced multisensory illusions are restricted to the same tem-
poral, spatial, and stimulus-specific characteristics as the
perceptual versions of the illusions. To the best of our knowl-
edge, these results provide the first direct behavioral evidence
of imagery-induced multisensory illusions.
In light of previous research on the similarities between
imagery and perception [13, 16, 23–26], the present findings
suggest that the same neural mechanisms involved in multi-
sensory integration of real stimuli are involved in integrating
imagined stimuli with real stimuli. Research in neuroscience
has linked the neuronal basis for multisensory interactions to
specific areas in the frontal, parietal, and temporal association
cortices, as well as to subcortical structures such as the supe-
rior colliculus and putamen [1, 27, 28]. These multisensory
areas are anatomical zones of convergence for visual, tactile,
and auditory signals and contain neurons that individually
integrate multisensory signals [1]. Moreover, neuroimaging
experiments have previously linked the cross-bounce [29],
ventriloquism [7], and McGurk [30] illusions to activity in these
multisensory areas, including the superior colliculus, posterior
parietal cortex, insula, thalamus, and superior temporal sulcus
[7, 29, 30]. However, although research on visual [10, 14,
15, 31], motor [16, 32], tactile [33], and auditory [26, 34] imagery
has found that the processing of real and imagined stimuli
share similar neural mechanisms, this line of research has
yet to directly explore whether the same neuronal mechanisms
involved in multisensory integration of perceptual stimuli can
be activated by imagined stimuli. Evidence in favor of the influ-
ence of imagery on multisensory perception has come from
neuroimaging experiments on haptic shape perception, which
have found overlapping activation [24] and network connectiv-
ity [25] of brain areas involved in imagery of objects and haptic
shape perception of familiar, but not unfamiliar, objects. This
finding suggests that imagery may be functionally involved in
certain multisensory percepts. However, our findings provide
the first testable paradigms with which to directly investigate
whether the neuronal signals generated by imagined stimuli
are capable of integrating with those from perceptual stimuli
of a different sensory modality.
Our results also corroborate the interpretation of a previous
study that found indirect behavioral evidence of a possible
crossmodal interaction between real and imagined stimuli
[35]. Mast et al. [35] found that participants experienced a shift
in the orientation of the visual horizon in the same direction
as an imagined visual stimulus of rotating dots. The authors
concluded that this finding is consistent with the literature
Imagery Induced Multisensory Illusions
1371on visual-vestibular multisensory interactions, which has
demonstrated that such interactions lead to illusory vestibular
motion. Because both the imagined stimulus and the reported
perception are in the same modality, it is difficult to determine
whether these results are an effect of an interaction between
the imagined stimuli and the vestibular system or merely an
effect of imagery per se. In our experiments, however, we
directly addressed whether imagery in one modality directly
affects perception in a different modality in three different
classic multisensory illusions, and we found consistent evi-
dence for multisensory integration. Furthermore, whereas pre-
vious studies have found that imagined stimuli can interact
with perceptual stimuli within the same modality [23, 35, 36]
or lead to top-down effects on perception [15, 37], our results
demonstrate that imagery can interact with a perceptual stim-
ulus from a different sensory modality to have a direct func-
tional impact on perception.
Together, our results provide strong support for perceptu-
ally based theories of imagery [10, 12] and represent an unpar-
alleled example of how imagination can change perception
[11, 13, 38]. This unique approach to investigating the func-
tional impact of imagery on multisensory perception broaches
an exciting new paradigm to investigate how the brain distin-
guishes between internally and externally generated sensory
signals [39]. Future research may determine the neural sub-
strates of imagery-induced multisensory perception as well
as the neural mechanisms behind one’s ability to distinguish
between endogenous and exogenous sensory events.
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Supplemental Information includes Supplemental Results, Supplemental
Experimental Procedures, and two figures and can be found with this article
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